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PROTEIN AND THE PILL - A PIVOTAL PARTNERSHIP 
B. Ddworth Gardner 
INTRODUCTION 
Two fearsome possibilities preoccupy thoughtful men everywhere 
in the world. These worries are unique to our own age and time. 
Lord Russell puts it succinctly, "The world is faced, at the present 
day, with two antithetical dangers: (a) the human race may put an 
end to itself by a too lavish use of H bombs; and (b) the human popu-
lation of our planet may increase to the point where only a starved 
and miserable existence is possible, except for a minority of powedul 
people." [78, p. 1]. 
Each of these dangers has its own characteristics, its own special 
perils, and its own possibilities for prevention. Nuclear war would 
bring swift and complete destruction of life as we know it. Whether 
or not such a war occurs, seemingly depends upon the wisdom of a 
few trusted leaders. On the other hand, so it is said, starvation is a 
gradual and agonizing phenomenon, already stealthily engulfing the 
world. The extent to which we endure the slow and dehumanizing 
destruction that is synonymous with starvation, depends on the indi-
vidual decisions of literally billions of human beings. 
The two threats are inter-related. A world in which one-third of 
the people live in extravagant opulence while two-thirds live in 
oppressive squalor is not conducive to political sta,bility. Such a world 
is particularly susceptible to violence, including mass nuclear destruc-
tion. There is little question that, as a rule, man's inclination towards 
aggressiveness declines in proportion to the spaciousness and comforts 
of his life. 
This lecture probes the questions of man's desire and ability to 
control his own numbers and to adequately provide himself with food. 
Over the past decade extensive literature has appeared on these 
problems. Much of it presents population growth trends since World 
War II and describes their implications for the future of mankind on 
this planet. Most observers are moderately to extremely pessimistic 
and forecast acute famine across the globe. The first major section 
of the lecture discusses these forecasts and the rationale underlying 
them. The second deals with the likelihood of a decreasing rate of 
/ population growth in the next few decades. The third explores the 
possibilities of increasing the world's food supplies. 
-3-
The general position taken throughout is that we have more 
promising options than is often thought, both for limiting population 
and for increasing food production. The facts do not warrant the 
prevailing pessimism. On the other hand, man has been known to 
ignore facts until it is often too late. In the past we have not auto-
matically recognized and exercised the best options. Effective research 
and education programs are indispensible if the future is to disprove 
our harbingers of doom and gloom. Diverse people must indulge in 
dialogues when problems are not properly identified and solutions are 
unclear. It is in the spirit of broaching basic issues and beginning 
the dialogue, rather than of providing definitive answers, that this lec-
ture is undertaken. 
THE HYPOTHESIS THAT POPULATION WILL OUTRUN 
FOOD SUPPLIES 
Some Facts on Population Growth 
Rates of world population growth remained low up to the 16th 
and 17th centuries due to epidemics, war and pillage, erosion, flood-
ing, and crop failures [27, p. 63]. From 850 B.C. to 1650 A.D'. the 
growth rate was about .07 percent per year [18, p. 8] Between 1650 
and 1850 the annual rate of increase doubled, and by 1920 it had 
doubled again. World population increased 1.1 percent per year in 
each of the three decades between 1920 and 1950 and 1.9 percent per 
year in the decade of the '50's and the first half of the '60's [31, p. 11]. 
In terms of numbers there were approximately 30 million people 
living in 3500 B. C. [18, p. 18]. The 100 million mark was. likely 
passed during the period 1000-500 B. C., and 200 million was reached 
during the early Roman period. World population grew slowly dur-
ing the first millenium of the Christian era and was about 275 million 
by 1000 A. D. By 1650 it was estimated at 500 million; by 1880 about 
925 million; by 1900 about 1,525 million; and by 1964 well over 3 
billion people [72, p. 1]. 
These world totals obscure the most significant developments in 
population growth, especially in the last 30 years. A sharp difference 
exists between the so-called developed world and the less-developed 
world in population growth rates. The developed world includes the 
United States and Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe includ-
ing the USSR, Oceania, and Japan. Th,e less-developed world is Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America. The less-developed countries are growing 
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in population much more rapidly than the developed ones. No 
developed countries have reproduction rates above 2 percent while' 
none of the less-developed countries have rates under 2 percent [97, 
p. 194]. 
In 1900 the population of the less-developed regions was about 
67 percent of the world's total [46, p. 4]. In 1960 it was 70 percent. 
In 2000, if trends continue, it will be nearly SO percent. Numerically 
this would represent an addition of almostt 3 billion to the less-
developed countries and only 436 million to the developed countries. 
The world population is presently growing at slightly less than 2 per-
cent per year. In the developed nations the rate of increase is about 
1.1 percent, while the less-developed nations are growing at about 
2.4 percent per year [31, p. 11]. Rates of growth in the advanced 
countries of Western Europe are less than 1 percent. Even in the 
United States, birth rates are rapidly declining. During the decade 
of the 1950's the growth rate in the U. S. was between 1.7 and 1.S per-
cent per year. By 1962 the growth rate had dropped to 1.5 percent, 
and 1966 it was only 1.1 percent. Last year the growth rate was 1 per-
cent, the lowest in this century. It is clear, therefore, that the cele-
brated "population explosion" is primarily a characteristic of poor 
countries. 
Reasons for the Explosion 
In peasant societies, crude birth rates are virtually everywhere 
above 40 per thousand [44, p. 310]. Rates of 45 per thousand ap-
proach the practical maximum, although higher levels are biologically 
possible. Historically, death rates have been almost as high. Popu-
lation growth occurs in such societies when death rates fall, as they 
have in the last 15 years because of the introduction of modem 
medical measures. It is as simple as that. 
This phenomenon is not new. Earlier in this century, Western 
Europe, Japan, the United States, and Canada experienced comparable 
reductions in death rates relative to birth rates. When this happened, 
the population in these countries increased. Rapid growth in the 
less-developed world today, however, poses a more dangerous problem 
because it is occurring in conjunction with such a preliminary state 
of economic development [27, p. 69]. One and one-half percent was 
the maximum population growth rate attained in the developed world, 
whereas in today's less-developed countries, 2.5 to 3.S percent are 
common. At an average annual in.crease of 3 percent, a population 
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doubles in 23 years. Where economies are relatively undeveloped, 
present rates of growth seriously constrain potential rises in the 
level of living. 
Over the long-run, even a 1 percent growth rate is unacceptable 
for both developed and poor countries. A demographer, Professor 
Hauser, points out: 
"One hundred persons multiplying at one percent per year for the 5,000 
years of human history would have produced a contemporary population of 
2.7 billion persons per square foot of land surface on the earth. Such an 
exercise in arithmetic, although admittedly dramatic and propagandistic, is 
also a conclusive way of demonstrating that a one percent per year increase in 
world population could not have taken place for very long in the past, nor 
can it continue for very long into the future" [47" p. 164]. 
The Gloomy Forecasts 
Most authorities agree that much, but by no means all, of the 
expected impact from modern medicine and sanitation has already 
occurred. Even so, some forecasts call for higher rates of population 
growth in the next few decades than at present. These projections 
acknowledge that birth rates are beginning to fall in less-developed 
nations just as they have in the developed world. The critical point 
is whether they will fall so slowly, that they will lag behind continued 
decreases in death rates. 
A number of recent books and articles are extremely pessimistic 
about our ability to continue feeding ourselves [102], [74], [68], 
[50], [98], [55]. For example, Dr. Riaymond Ewell, a Vice President 
of the State University of New York at Buffalo and an eminent scien-
tist, says: 
"U trends continue, it seems likely that famine will reach serious proportions 
in India, Pakistan, and Communist China in the early 1970's. Indonesia, 
Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil, and several other countries will follow within 
a few years, and most other countries will fall in this category by 1980. 
Such a famine would be of massive 'proportions affecting hundreds of mil-
lions, possibly even billions of people. U this happens, as now appears 
probable, it will be the most colossal catastrophy in history." [34, p. 1]. 
It was just about a year ago that President Johnson said in his 
State of the Union Message, «Next to the pursuit of peace, the really 
greatest challenge to the human family is the race between food 
supply and population increase. That race tonight is being lost." 
Senator George McGovern (D., South D'akota ) amplifies on the 
same theme: 
«The world is running out of food. That is a fact of life and of death. Not 
just death for the hundreds of thousands who are starving routinely today, 
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but for hundreds of millions, a scale comparable only to nuclear holocaust, 
within the next three decades. Horrified historians may record that as the 
world sped on a collision course with starvation, its great powers fiddled with 
the war in Viet Nam, a crisis in Berlin, a contest in arsenal building and a 
race to the moon" [63, p. 86]. 
Nor is this depressing view confined to this side of the Atlantic. 
Sir Charles Darwin, a great grandson of the famous biologist of the 
same name says: 
"It is curious how long the world is taking to perceive that we are living in 
what is a fantastically abnonnal period of history, and one which must 
inevitably end soon. It is the high rate of population increase already noted 
more than a century ago that makes the present time so abnonnal. We can 
say with confidence that all our present conditions in life cannot continue 
for more than two centuries, and this is most likely a great over-estimate. 
We have, within what historians would call an exceedingly short period, to 
revert to a mode of life which in one way or another will keep numbers of 
the human race roughly constant" [25, p. 30]. 
One of the longest books on the subject and the most pessimistic 
is called Famine 1875, by William and Paul Paddock. 
"Ten years from now (1975), parts of the underdeveloped world will be 
suffering from famine. In 15 years the famine will be catastrophic and 
revolutions and social turmoil and economic upheavals will sweep areas of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America" [68, p. 8]. 
The Paddocks contend that some parts of the world have already 
passed the point of no return; their course towards starvation has been 
irrevocably charted, and not even the power and resources of the rich 
nations can change the inevitable and horrible destruction [68, p. 207]. 
The Paddocks argue that aid should be extended only to those nations 
which still have a chance (and for most even this is remote) to bring 
food and people into balance. 
The foregoing are only examples of the prevalent point of view. 
Many, many others could be cited. 
A Dissenting View 
I do not believe the best evidence supports such a fatalistic, 
alarmist, and pessimistic prognostication of the future. This is not to 
say that our problems are not urgently grave. Certainly the political 
and social implications of the ever-widening disparity in the economic 
wealth of rich and poor nations are closely related to the steady 
deterioriation of the physical and natural environments in which men 
live in both rich and poor countries. But billions of people dying 
from starvation? I think not. Why? 
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In brief, people in rich nations and poor have hardly begun to 
recognize, much less utilize, the arsenal of weapons available to them 
for solving population and food problems. I believe that before fam-
ine threatens on a large scale mankind shall have taken the necessary 
action to curtail population growth and increase food production. 
Moreover, the stock of useful weapons that can be employed in the 
battle willI increase in both quality and quantity as time passes. The 
remainder of this lecture attempts to establish the validity of my 
optimism. 
My views on these matters are inextricably linked wtih my pro-
fessional discipline, among other things. In fact, the correlation 
between a man's professional field and his views on these questions 
is strikingly demonstrated in the literature. Almost invariably the 
physical and biological scientists predict disaster, whereas the econo-
mists are the most optimistic that the problems will be resolved. The 
remainder of the social scientists, including the majority of demo-
graphers, seem to categorize at about the middle of the continuum. 
In many ways this is an ironic about-face from an earlier period. 
It was an economist, the Reverend Thomas R. Malthus, about 150 
years ago, who thoroughly frightened everyone with his theory pre-
dicting the "doom" of mankind in his An Essay on Population. His 
theory effectively captured economics for so long a period that the 
Scottish writer, Thomas Carlyle, dubbed economics the "dismal 
science." Generations of students would probably agree that Carlyles 
appellation was apt. 
But Malthus was wrong in his predictions. To some extent in 
nearly all nations, but especially in the Western world, man has made 
steady progress in bettering his economic well-being as well as the 
quality of his life. 
Then how do we explain the current resurrection of Malthus' 
doctrine. One interpretation, perhaps comforting to economists, would 
be that as a prophet, Malthus was indeed perceptive but born too 
soon. Finally, after 150 years, he is being proved right, as evidenced 
by the disciple scientists, demographers, politicians, etc., climbing on 
the Malthusian bandwagon. 
Despite the temptation to further promulgate this point of view 
and help exonerate Malthus and nearly a century of the "dismal 
science," I believe it would be folly to do so. Malthus' theory was 
error-ridden in his own time, and I think it is no less vulnerable today. 
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Our current group of pessimists are just as likely to be wrong, besides 
being 150 years late in coming around to Malthus' point of view. 
It is admittedly disturbing to attack a brother economist. I am 
reluctant to contribute to the "credibility gap" that has persistently 
afflicted economists. As a profession we have erred so often that 
we have a reputation for being wrong much of the time. This means 
that I cannot appeal to a blind faith in the authority of my profession, 
but am forced to depend strictly on the factual evidence that I can 
marshall to support my point of view. 
Hindsight permits easy recognition of where and how Malthus 
went wrong. His arithmetic was impeccable as he showed that man 
has the capacity to perpetuate himself at a geometric rate. Malthus 
must have seen the declining death rates in Western Europe at the 
time as indicating that burgeoning numbers of people were inevitable. 
He reasoned that man's capacity to produce food was limited by the 
quantity of tillable land, and that increases in food production could 
at best proceed at an arithmetic rate. The unavoidable prognosis was 
that population would grow until food supplies per capita would not 
be sufficient to sustain life. Starvation would reduce man's numbers 
to levels where food capacity could sustain life at a kind of equilibrium 
precisely at the starvation level. 
Instead, over a large portion of the earth, man has improved his 
level of living substantially and almost continuously since Malthus' 
day both in terms of general wealth and in terms of per capita food 
production. Malthus has developed a logical theory, apparently 
grounded thoroughly on the significant explanatory variables. Why 
didn't it prove out? Essentially because the world changed in ways 
that were impossible for him to foresee. His theory would have been 
valid if the world were static and unchanging. 
Dramatic changes in two vital areas were especially influential: 
(a) the rapid fall in birth rates primarily because of contraception, 
and (b) the sharp advances in agricultural and industrial technology. 
Although the latter factor produced the more impressive changes in 
the 19th century, the former promises to be equally effective in the 
20th in generating a different world than Malthus knew. 
It is my opinion that our current group of neo-Malthusians are 
equally guilty of failing to foresee the advances in technology that 
are almost certain to occur in the kind of world in which we live. 
Chancellor Murphy of UCLA says it well: 
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"Essential to survival and progress for the remainder of the 20th Century 
is acceptance of the fact that we live in lthe midst of revolution - a period of 
unprecedented and rapid change without end in sight" [61, p.74]. 
Change and revolution do not automatically equate with improve-
ment, however, especially if they are unanticipated. With adequate 
planning, at least some of the changes we will experience in the next 
100 years could be deliberately designed to mitigate man's food 
problems. 
The difficulty in making valid projections is essentially metho-
dological. University of Chicago demographer, Professor Donald 
Bogue, sums it up well: 
"For more than a century demographers have territorized themselves, each 
other, and the public at large with the essential hopelessness, inevitability, 
and morale-breaking pessimism of the population explosion via expotential 
growth. These prophecies have all been dependent upon one premise, 'if 
recent trends continue.' It is an ancient statistical fallacy to perform extra-
polation upon this premise when, in fact, the premise is invalid" [8, p. 74]. 
Professor Bogue seems to be saying that when technological and 
attitudinal factors are changing as rapidly as they are now, it is un-
realistic to predict the future by exrapolating past trends in such 
large aggregate variables as population growth and food production. 
We will derive more accurate predictions by analyzing growth and 
food production. 
Besides, even if it were valid to extrapolate trends in population 
growth and food production, it would be patently unwise to choose 
the period of the 1950's and early 1960's for such purposes. Dramati-
cally effective measures were being taken for the first time to reduce 
death rates in the less-developed countries. The initial impact cannot 
possibly be extended far into the future. Besides, there is no indica-
tion that current rates of population growth are desired by the people 
in the less-developed nations now. In fact, as argued in the next 
major section, the evidence is quite the opposite. 
The Problem in the Short and Long Runs 
Saying that the gloomy forecasts of world starvation are wrong, 
however, does not mean that programs to reduce population and 
increase food supplies should be abandoned or even slackened. Quite 
the contrary, if we want to negate the gloom, we must advance and 
augment these programs. The excellent prospects for eliminating 
hunger from the face of the earth should spur us to vigorously push 
ahead with the task of bringing this eventuality to reality. 
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Specific programs should get top, national priority now. The 
high birth rates of the 50's and 60's produced children whose presence 
already requires large increases in food supplies. Reductions in birth 
rates are likely to occur somewhat slowly. Our first priority, short-
run objective, therefore, must be to increase world-wide food pro-
duction. 
Over the long-run, however, it is essential that the world's popu-
lation be stabilized at some equilibrium level that will allow the 
resources of the earth to provide an abundant and healthy life for 
the earth's population. It is of crucial importance that advanced 
nations promote and give adequate support to voluntary birth control 
programs throughout the world. Because many decades will be 
required to define and stabilize desirable population levels, under even 
exceptionally favorable conditions, a real burst of effort to simply 
lower birth rates should be expended now. The more progress we 
can make in reducing population growth, the more manageable will 
be our food problems. 
THE PROSPECTS FOR POPULATION CONTROL 
Population control is one of the most urgent needs of mankind. If 
it isn't achieved by controlled birth it will eventually be accomplished 
by uncontrolled death. Since population control could mean an 
abundant life for everyone, I believe that when the options are clear, 
rational man must choose the course of birth control. The options, 
other than world starvation or nuclear war seem to be these - logi-
cally calculated numbers of people living under conditions that permit 
dignity and beauty to the individual life versus larger numbers of 
people whose lives are severely restricted in scope and satisfaction. 
Many of the earth's people now oppose birth control for various 
moral reasons. Space does not permit a full treatment of the issues 
here. But I see all the moral issues as basically reducible to a choice 
between controlling births now and increasing the death rate at some 
time in the future. To me, increasing the death rate by any conceiv-
able means is morally repugnant in the extreme. Therefore, I hold 
that restricting births is the least morally objectionable way of limit-
ing population. 
Shifts in Attitudes Regarding Birth Control 
From the aggregate social point of view, certain circumstances 
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routinely result when population growth exceeds available food sup-
plies. The most obvious are food scarcities, higher food prices, and 
decreased living standards. From the individual point of view, how-
ever, where birth decisions are actually made, the rationale rarely 
incorporates all these factors. Each family is an infinitesimally small 
segment of society. An individual couple is rarely inclined to think 
that the number of children they decide to have will vitally influence 
the national or world scene. Moral suasion campaigns to convince 
individual families to restrict births, therefore, have little effect un-
less accompanied by economic incentives. There will always be a 
tendency to «pass the buck" and expect other families to do the 
restricting as long as the given family can hold its living standards at 
some acceptable level. In other words, if a family planning program 
in any part of the world is to be effective, it must provide direct, 
tangible incentives to the individual family to reduce births. Pro-
grams are now being mounted all around the globe that give families 
such incentives. 
The president of the Population Council, Dr. Frank W. Notestein, 
recently said, 
"We now have a basis for expecting that a rapid decline in birth rates can 
be achieved in the next decade. In this hopeful judgment four elements 
are important: (1) the development of national policies favoring family plan-
ning, (2) the demonstrated public interest in limited child bearing, (3) the 
improvement of contraceptive technology, and (4) the fact that for the first 
time in history, several Oriental populations have begun to count their birth 
rates as a result of governmental programs to spread the practice of birth 
control" [64, p. 170]. 
These factors have also persuaded Professor Bogue to be very 
optimistic, 
"Recent developments in the world wide movement to bring runaway birth 
rates under control are such that it is now possible to assert with considerable 
confidence that the prospects for rapid fertility control are excellent. In 
fact, it is quite reasonable to assume that the world population crisis is a 
phenomenon of the twentieth century and will be largely, if not entirely, 
a matter of history when humanity moves into the 21st Century. No doubt, 
there will be isolated pockets of population hardship in the year 2000, but 
the outlook is tllat they will be confined to a few nations that were too pre-
judiced, too bureaucratic, or too disorganized to take action sooner, or will 
be confined to small regions within some countries where particular ethnic, 
economic, or religious groups will not yet have received adequate fertility 
control services and information for a sufficient span of time to complete the 
demographic transition to lower fertility" [8, p.72]. 
The experience of the developed nations demonstrates that atti-
tudes are the most important factor in, birth control. Access to better 
birth control methods appears to have influenced the decline in birth 
rates in Europe. But the people had to be willing to use the methods. 
-12-
Strong evidence from studies over the last 25 years in the United 
States, Great Britain, and Scandanavia, indicates that many millions ' 
of couples have and do practice coitus interruptus to successfully 
control fertility [66, p. 128]. This method has been known and prac-
ticed for thousands of years. The failure of birth rates to fall in other 
countries indicates a persistent lack of strong motivations to control 
family size. 
Much of the absence of motivation in the less-developed countries 
in times past can be explained by the traditional role of children in 
the family unit. In these societies there were no social security pro-
grams and children, especially sons, were expected to care for their 
parents in old age. Where child mortality rates were about 50 per-
cent, and two sons were deemed necessary to share the old-age burden 
of the parents, eight child births would be required on the average, 
assuming a 50-50 split of male and female babies. Also, in peasant 
societies where children do not go to school, but instead work on the 
fann, a child becomes an economic asset early in life. These factors 
suggest that children, far from being unwanted by parents, were 
deemed essential for economic reasons. But times change, and these 
factors no longer exert the force they once did. 
Almost two-thirds of the people in developing regions of the 
world now have contact with government-sponsored family planning 
programs [8, p. 64]. These programs exist in India, Pakistan, China, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malasia, Ceylon, Turkey, the 
United Arab Republic, Tunisia, Monoco, Honduras, and Jamaica, and 
more are being initiated every year. 
Not only do government programs exist, they are effective and 
promise to be even more effective in the future. The majority of 
couples with three living children uniformly wish to have no more. 
A 1965 national survey of family planning in South Korea provides a 
good example [8, p. 79]. The following are results from that survey: 
(a) 89 percent of the wives and 79 percent of the husbands approved 
of family planning; (b) the rate of approval was only slightly lower 
in the rural than in the urban areas; (c) of the minority who dis-
approved, only 8 percent gave religion or morals as the reason; (d) 
inability to read was no barrier, 81 percent of those unable to read 
nevertheless approved of family planning; (e) on the verbal level, the 
majority declared themselves willing to practice family planning if 
given services; (f) unwillingness to practice family planning was con-
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centrated primarily among young couples who had not yet had the 
number of children they desired and older couples who were ap-
proaching the end of their childbearing; (g) as a result of a national 
information program, 85 percent of the urban and 83 percent of the 
rural population had heard of family planning, and 67 percent of the 
urban and 64 percent of the rural population knew of at least one 
contraceptive method; (h) at the time of the interview, 21 percent of 
the urban and 14 percent of the rural couples were practicing family 
planning. Even among the illiterate population, 10 percent were 
currently practicing family planning. 
The experience in Korea is not atypical. Survey data from some 
20 less-developed countries show that, without exception, substantial 
majorities of married couples want to restrict their childbearing [64, 
p. 171]. It seems clear, therefore, that if contraceptive devices were 
available at low cost, people in less-developed countries the world 
over would actively participate in population control programs. 
The estimate of interest is based on much more than responses to 
surveys. In many societies a large number of crude and illegal abor-
tions eloquently testify to the desire to restrict population [64, p. 172]. 
The problem of children and old-age security is being gradually 
offset by declining child mortality rates, which assure that many fewer 
births are necessary than in times. past to provide this security. In 
addition, more and more countries are initiating governmental pro-
grams for old age care as a substitute for family care. This justification 
for large families is therefore much less compelling than it once was. 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS 
OF CONTRACEPTION 
Contraceptive devices have been used for hundreds of years, and 
in the developed countries are widely employed today. The less-de-
veloped countries, however, are far behind in birth control . They now 
need a method that is both effective and inexpensive. The two devices 
that seem most promising are the intra-uterine device (IUD) and the 
steroid pills, although at present the latter are far too costly to be 
practical in the poorer nations [64, p. 173]. Other methods such as 
condoms, diaphrams, vaginal jellies, sterilization of both male and 
female, and abortions are often used to prevent births, but for one 
reason or another do not seem to offer the long-run promise of the pill 
and the IUD. 
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The IUD, a small plastic device which is inserted in the uterine 
opening, seems to be especially suitable. In a recent test in India, ' 
pregnancies were reported by only one out of every 611 women who 
used the device over a 2-year study period [57, p. 2]. In addition, 
expulsion of the device, earlier a rather serious shortcoming, occurred 
only with 6 percent of the women who participated in the test. Both 
the degree of effectiveness and the low rate of expulsion make this 
device technically feasible for less-developed countries. 
It is truly extraordinary how rapidly these devices are being adopt-
ed. Over 2 million IUDs had been inserted prior to June, 1966 in 
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. The current rate 
is over 3 million per year, and the rate is accelerating [34, p. 3]. 
At long last, India has begun to move forward on a massive pro-
gram of IUD use. Over 1 million IUDs had been inserted by June, 
1966 and the number reached 3 million by early 1967. India is 
planning 10 million insertions per year by 1969 or 1970. 
India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt began producing IUDs in 1965 
and 1966, making these countries independent of sources of supply 
from the developed world [34, p. 3]. 
Most significant is the fact that each IUD costs only a few cents. 
If the devices are produced by the government and distributed through 
a government program by doctors, the cost to the individual family is 
almost zero. The major constraint on the use of this device in many 
less-developed countries could be the number of physicians required. 
It has been found, however, that one doctor can insert at least 40 de-
vices in one day, which works out to be about 10,000 per year [57, p.2]. 
This means that 1,000 doctors could fit 10 million women in a single 
year. Few nations could not provide the doctors required, assuming 
these programs received high national priority. 
Reliable sources also indicate that Communist China is vigorously 
promoting birth control by a variety of medical, economic, and social 
means. These reports have led many demographers to guess that 
China's birth rate and population growth rate are declining and are 
already much lower than India's [35, p. 10]. 
Whereas the IUD has been used primarily in Asia, both the pill 
and IUD have been used with increasing frequency in Latin America. 
The pill is absolutely effective when taken correctly [64, p. 173]. Pres-
ently, however, it has two drawbacks: (a) it is difficult for illiterate 
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people, who cannot count beyond a few numbers, to take the pill as 
systematically as is necessary; (b) costs of the pill are now prohibitive 
for most people in the poor countries. It has recently been reported, 
however, that the pill can be produced for about 15¢ per monthly 
cycle [64, p. 173]. If it could be distributed to less-developed coun-
tries at this price, it might provide a good alternative to the IUD. 
Nor is the whole story on the contraceptive front. Further techno-
logical advances are highly probable. Several possibilities are now 
being studied by using animals. One of the most promising is an in-
jection or implant that will prevent pregnancy for a year or more at a 
cost well under 50¢ per year [64, p. 173]. 
Clearly man has the technology with which he can reduce the 
birth rate at a cost that is well within reach of nearly all nations. The 
time is obviously right to push forward with all kinds of encouragement 
for birth prevention. This must include massive aid from the devel-
oped nations in terms of financial resources, educational programs, and 
the technology of birth control. 
The Impact of Abortion 
The countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Uruguay and Israel have reduced 
their birth rates mainly by contraception, although legal and/or illegal 
abortion has been a significant factor in all cases. In the USSR, the 
Eastern European countries, and Japan, birth rates have been signif-
icantly reduced primarily by legal abortion, although contraceptive 
devices have also been used. Abortion is probably a more important 
factor than contraception on a world-wide basis in keeping birth rates 
down to their present levels [34, p. 3]. Certainly where abortion is 
common, it provides convincing evidence of ample motivation for fam-
ily planning. The problem is that of times abortion is performed, espe-
cially in the less-developed nations, with such primitive and unsanitary 
methods that many maternal deaths occur and much pain and suffer-
ing result. 
The case of Japan is one of the most dramatic examples in history 
of a country drastically reducing its birth rate in a short time. The 
Japanese have done it with legalized abortion. Japan reduced her birth 
rate between 1947 and 1959 from 34.3 to 17.5 per thousand [53, p.52]. 
She thus moved from a country with one of the highest birth rates in 
the world to one of the lowest. Of course, Japan now has the wealth 
and the medical expertise to make abortion safe as well as practical. 
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Certainly for the majority of the less-developed nations, abortion is not 
a recommended alternative at the present time for purely medical 
reasons, even if the religious beliefs of the country would penn it it. 
On the question of morality, a great many people in the world 
regard abortion as being synonymous with murder. They will accept 
it, if at all, only as a last resort. But even here m the United States 
where this view is prevalent, opinions can change rather quickly, as 
indicated by new abortion laws in Colorado, North Carolina and Calif-
ornia. 
The Interaction of Economic Conditions and Birth Rates 
Economic factors and birth rates interact in many ways. Accord-
ing to one study, about 47 percent of inter-country differences in birth 
rates can be accounted for by social and cultural factors associated 
with urbanization and industrialization [4, p. 142]. The more urban-
ized the country is, the more likely it is to have low birth rates. The 
relationship between per capita incomes and birth rates among coun-
tries is inverse. 
Results of another study indicated that within a country the higher 
the income of the husband, the smaller is the family size likely to be. 
If the wife works outside the home, child spacing tends to be affected 
more than total family size, although a long work history is associated 
with fewer children [41, p. 419]. 
With, a given level of family income, it is axiomatic that a large 
family means lower per capita income than a small family. High pop-
ulation growth rates thus effectively constrain improvement in living 
standards. 
There are many reasons why heavy population growth can be ex-
pected to curtail economic development. If a country is to develop 
industrially, it must first find enough new investment for agriculture to 
increase productivity and create excess labor which can move to non-
fann employment. Concurrently there must be new investment in 
industry to create the demand for labor and relieve population pressure 
on the land [53, p.8]. A necessary prerequisite for a progressive urban 
society is governmental revenues that will pennit adequate expendi-
tures for education and health and a variety of other public services. 
High birth rates generally operate to reduce savings and per capita 
incomes, all of which increase the burden of taxation to finance govern-
mental expenditures. A large number of births produces high percent-
ages of dependent children, who decrease the proportion of family 
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income that can be used for purposes other than subsistence. High 
birth rates are often associated with overcrowding and disease, and 
when health is undennined economic productivity is reduced. 
Technological development also tends to be slow when population 
growth is high because stagnant per capita incomes are not conducive 
to the growth of those sectors which require capital and modem tech-
niques [36, p. 301]. There is not enough slack above subsistance to 
permit more advanced and risky entrepreneurship, and there are no 
markets for goods that are produced. With two exceptions [20, p. 438] 
[48, p. 176], economists agree that high population growth rates, such 
as those existing in many of the less-developed nations today, severely 
constrain economic development. 
The recent increases in per capita incomes in most of the less-
developed nations have occurred despite high population growth 
rates, and not because of them. Increases in income have resulted 
from technological advances in the main. When they came to realize 
that population growth actually reduces per capita incomes and living 
standards, I believe that most couples throughout the world would 
rather limit family size than suffer decreases in their standards of 
living. This is certainly what happened in Ireland after the great 
potato famine in the last century. It would be especially true now 
if family planning services and contraceptives were available at low 
cost. 
Many of the apparent food shortages in the less-developed nations 
may be more illusory than real. Food shortages can co-exist with 
increased per capita food consumption. How can this be so? One 
of the important implications of increases in per capita income through-
out the world is that the demand for food is increased. The income 
elasticity for food is much higher in the undeveloped than in the 
developed world. It runs from.5 to .8 in the poor countries [59, p. 
4] . This means that an increase in income of $1 will increase expendi-
tures on food from 50¢ to 80¢. Rising incomes, therefore, increase 
the demand for food relative to the supply, and food shortages appear. 
But in terms of nutrients consumed per person, the increased demand 
does not actually reduce the supply. If as usually happens, the in-
creased income is unevenly distributed over the whole population, 
absolute and acute shortages of food may exist for those who do not 
participate in the income growth. Average per capita consumption 
of food, however, may remain unchanged or perhaps even advance 
even though food shortages exist. 
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There is one rather salutary result from increasing incomes, even 
if they are not uniformly distributed. More real productive resources 
can be available to the economy to convert into food supplies if the 
decision makers opt for more food at the expense of other things. 
Direct economic incentives can be used deliberately as a brake 
on population growth. I believe that governments and international 
agencies should have relied to a much greater extent on these devices 
to penalize families which get excessively large. Rather, in almost 
all countries around the world, governmental policies encourage popu-
lation growth. There are often direct subsidies for having children, 
such as governmental social services calculated on the basis of the 
number of children in the family. Examples include the standard 
exemption per child in income tax laws, welfare benefits, and the free 
educational and other social services available to all children. 
Suppose that a substantial tax were levied on each child born to 
a family beyond some stipulated number - say three. Such a policy 
would almost certainly produce a drastic decline in birth rates, and is 
entirely ethical. Since children impose cost on society as well as on 
the family, society is justified in attempting to recover the costs in the 
form of a tax. Couples that desire large families could still have 
them if they were willing to pay the price. Such a tax would be no 
more unethical than any other kind of tax. Many similar economic 
schemes could be used and would be effective. People obviously 
respond to these kinds of incentives in other decisions regarding the 
expenditure of family resources. It is a universally accepted economic 
law that as the price of a commodity (and childern can be regarded 
for our purposes here as such a commodity) goes up, the quantity 
demanded goes down. 
Fertility and Educational Level 
Nations that have low levels of literacy and education inevitably 
also have high birth rates and low per capita incomes [56, p. 216]. 
In developed countries, declines in fertility occurred as concomitants 
of economic and social development among people whose levels of 
education were appreciable and increasing. 
Countries that have a high percentage of all children in school 
typically have a low birth rate which has followed a generally declin-
ing trend. On the other hand, countries that have yet to develop 
desirable school enrollments typically have high birth rates which 
have generally been tending upwards during the preceding 10 to 15 
years [51, p. 207]. 
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Studies on the relative effects of religion and education on women 
relative to birth rates in Latin America showed education to be the 
stronger factor [51, p. 209]. Reproduction among the more religiously 
devout women proved to be significantly lessened as educational 
achievement increased. The experience of most countries seems to 
be that the years of education that the wife has are inversely related 
to the number of children born [51, p. 208]. 
Data on primary and secondary school enrollment and birth rates 
for 49 countries gave correlation coefficients showing a strong negative 
relationship between education and birth rates [51, p. 209]. 
The trouble is that countries whose populations are growing 
fastest, are having equally impressive difficulty in increasing their 
educational attainments. Some are actually declining in percentages 
of children in school. It will be many years before several will have 
literary rates of 50 percent. Still, almost all seem to be making a 
major effort to educate their people. This will undoubtedly have a 
desirable effect on population in the long-run. Some countries that 
can hardly be called rich, such as Taiwan, Japan and Cuba have greatly 
increased their country-wide educational levels in a short period of 
time and this has no doubt contributed to reduced birth rates. For 
most countries, however, a high level of educational attainment 
requires a long time to achieve. The poorest nations, therefore, cannot 
rely on education alone to stabilize population levels. 
Foreign Aid in Birth Control 
Given the fact that attitudes around the world seem to favor 
family planning and the use of contraceptives, the time is propitious 
for the developed world to increase its support of family planning 
programs in the less-developed nations. The less-developed countries 
simply are not now in a position to provide all the resources needed 
for an effective campaign to stabilize population. Professor Steven 
Enke has shown that 1 dollar spent in the less-developed countries 
for contraceptives is worth about $100 in other forms of aid associated 
with economic development [84, p.16]. President Johnson in his 
San Francisco message commemorating the 20th anniversary of the 
United Nations said: "Let us act on the fact that less than $5 invested 
in population control is worth $100 invested in economic growth" 
[8, p. 6]. If either Professor Enke or President Johnson are near the 
mark, the evidence is very strong that aid in this form should be 
greatly increased, if economic development is our primary goal. 
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Many private foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller and other 
private groups, such as the Population Council and the International ' 
Planned Parenthood Federation, are active abroad in promoting family 
planning. Just last November (1967), the 50-nation International 
Planned Parenthood Federation approved a crash program in Latin 
America calling for 60 billion dollars, double its 1967 budget, to 
establish and equip clinics, train doctors and paramedical staff, supply 
contraceptives, develop educational materials and publicity, and sup-
port research projects at universities and hospitals. 
But the foundations and private groups cannot hope to do all 
that must be done. National governments must join hands with 
private groups and international agencies to provide the necessary 
help. The most powerful effort imaginable to encourage birth control 
could not cost anything like 1 percent as much as is being poured 
into economic development. Indeed, the cost of preventing one birth, 
even if as much as $20.00, falls far short of the cost for 1 year of 
schooling [64, p. 179]. 
Our own country has given lip service to helping developing 
nations reduce their birth rates since the early Kennedy years, but 
only this fiscal year has Congress and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) begun to mount a significant program. During 
fiscal 1968, AID expects to spend $35 million on family planning pro-
grams as opposed to $4.2 million in the previous year [17, p. 611]. 
These resources will provide contraceptives (both IUDs and the pill), 
professional experts in family planning, and other equipment needed 
for programs. AID has thus become, almost overnight, the largest 
single supporter in the advanced nations of family-planning programs 
in less-developed countries. This development is an impressive begin-
ning, but only a beginning. 
To summarize, the shifts in attitudes taking place around the 
world relating to family planning, the availability of effective and 
cheap contraceptives, the increasing acceptance of abortion, the 
generally rising economic well-being of the world, and the increasing 
educational levels, all are operating now to reduce birth rates. In 
addition, the developed nations seem inclined to assist less-developed 
nations promote family planning programs. The total effect must 
surely suggest declining birth rates and perhaps eventual stabilization 
of population levels. This conclusion is supported by Professor Bogue 
when he says: 
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"The following generalizations appear to be justified. The trend of the 
world-wide movement toward fertility control has already reached a state 
where declines in death rates are being surpassed by declines in birth rates. 
Because progress in death control is slackening and progress in birth control 
is accelerating, the world has already entered a situation where the pace of 
population growth has begun to slacken. The exact time at which this 
switch over took place cannot be known exactly, but we estimate it to have 
occurred about 1965. From 1965 onward, therefore, the rate of world 
population growth may be expected to decline with each passing year. The 
rate of growth will slacken at such a pace that it will be zero at about the 
year 2000 so that population growth will not be regarded as a major social 
problem except in isolated and small retarded areas" [8. p. 83]. 
Other demographers seem to agree. Dudley Kirk has said: 
«Grounds for optimism that birth rates can be brought down in time 
to avert a rise in death rates has ... never been more hopeful than it 
is today" [91, p. 49]. Mr. Kirk and Gavin Jones said at a 1967 con-
ference: "With the knowledge that we now have, it seems possible 
to reduce the annual increase in population by one-third within 10 
years at a cost less than that of a national campaign against malaria." 
[8, p. 65]. 
Prospects for Increased Food Production 
The excellent prospects for stabilizing population over the long-run 
does not obviate the short-run necessity of feeding the people who 
are presently on the earth and those who will be born while population 
control is being realized. In many parts of the world an acute food 
shortage has existed for centuries and ways must be found to alleviate 
it [101, p. 14]. Since population growth rates will probably decline 
with the passage of time, the next decade or two are the most critical. 
If the food problem can be alleviated for that period it will likely 
also be manageable thereafter. 
The. Extent of Malnutrition and Undernourishment in the World 
Undernourishment is inadequacy of the diet in terms of calories. 
If continued over a long period of time, undernourishment results in 
loss of normal body weight or reduction of physical activity or both. 
Malnutrition refers to inadequacy of the nutritional quality of the 
diet. The protein content of the diet, especially animal protein, is a 
widely accepted indicator of nutritional quality, while total calories 
consumed reflects the degree of nourishment. 
The Third World Food Survey conducted by F AO suggested that 
average calorie consumption in Europe, North America, and Oceania 
exceeded daily requirements of people in these areas by some 20 per-
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cent. In the Near East, Africa, and Latin America, average consump-
tion was about equal to requirements. Since calorie consumption is 
not distributed equally among people, there must have been some 
undernourishment in these areas. In the Far East, calorie consumption 
fell short of requirements by some 10 percent. A considerable pro-
portion of people in this region, therefore, must be going hungry at 
least part of the time. One estimate of the proportion of under-
nourished people in the world as a whole is between 10 and 15 per-
cent, of 325 to 450 million [96, p. 4). 
The situation is quite different when it comes to malnutrition. 
The Economic and Social Council Committee on Levels of Living 
states that if the proportion of calories taken from cereals, starchy 
roots, and sugar exceeds two-thirds, malnutrition exists. The inci-
dence of malnutrition in less-developed regions is estimated at 60 
percent [96, p. 7]. Since some people in the developed countries are 
also ill-fed by this standard, it is likely that up to half of the people 
(1.5 billion) in the world are suffering from lack of sufficient nutrients. 
Substantial disparities in both nutrition and nourishment dis-
tinguish the developed and less-developed nations. The billion people 
in the developed nations have half again as many total calories and 5 
times as much high-quality animal protein per person as the 2 billion 
people in the developing nations [39, p. 308]. For example, a typical 
Indian eats his grain directly as human food, and gets about 2000 
calories per day from this source. In addition, he mayor may not 
get another 400 calories in vegetables, making a total of from 2000-
2400 calories per day. In the United States, at the other extreme, 
most edible plants are fed to livestock, and the average American 
obtains one-third of his diet calories from meat, milk, and eggs. 
Although his actual calorie consumpion is about 3000 per day, the 
American actually consumes about 11,000 plant-equivalent calories, 
which is about 5 times his Indian counterpart. 
Dr. B. R. Sen, Director-General of FAO has said: 
"It would appear that the gap in available food supplies per capita between 
the rich and the poor nations is widening rather than narrowing, and this 
in spite of all the efforts that have been made by national governments and 
international agencies in promoting economic development" [90, p. 285]. 
This widening gap between rich and poor countries may be at 
least partially responsible for the prevalent view that the world food 
situation is growing progressively worse with time and that famine 
is inevitable. It is easy for people getting fatter and fatter to attribute 
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famine to those areas where people are becoming relatively but not 
absolutely thinner and thinner. From the best data we have from the 
less-developed countries, food production increased substantially 
faster than population in 21 of 26 less-developed countries from the 
period 1948 to 1963. From 1955 to 1963, population increases ex-
ceeded food production in only 2 of 26 countries [8, p. 160]. If the 
people-food balance has deteriorated significantly, it should have 
shown up in this period of maximum population growth. A book just 
published (November, 1967) [59, p.11] indicates that increases in food 
production have been at about 3 percent per year for the last 20 
years, despite bad droughts in Asia in 1965 and 1966. It will be 
recalled from the previous section that the world's population growth 
has been slightly less than 2 percent over the same period. Thus, there 
have been significant gains in per capita food production in the 
world as a whole. A continued rate of growth of food production of 
3 percent will be quite adequate in reducing malnutrition and under-
nourishment as population growth rates decline in the future, provid-
ing food distribution can be effectuated to areas of deficiency. 
Dr. A. T. Mosher, President of the Agricultural Development 
Council, said late last year: 
"At the moment we are holding our own in food production. There have 
been fewer widespread famines in recent years than in previous eras and 
major technological breakthroughs with respect to food production are 
probable" [52, p. 22]. 
Another indirect test as to whether food is becoming increasingly 
scarce is the relative price of food over time. Prices of commodities 
that are in relatively short supply as related to demand tend to rise. 
With all the available income and wealth, even in poor countries, 
which could be used to purchase food, scarcities would drive prices 
up. A recent report of the National Advisory Commission on Food 
and Fiber [5, p. II-46] indicates that over the study period 1955 
through 1964, the relative price of food rose in only 9 of the 26 
developed countries. Only 33 of 69 less-developed countries, less 
than half, had food prices rising faster than other prices. This result 
would be highly unlikely if food shortages were becoming more acute. 
\Vhether or not famine problems are intensifying, however, the 
status quo is intolerable. Inadequacy or imbalance in the supply of 
nutrients (especially essential amino acids) has been found to retard 
both physical and mental development in children [39, p. 308] [59, 
p. 3]. As long as hunger exists anywhere in the world, we who are 
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more fortunate should vigorously strive to overcome it. People suf-
fering either from malnourishment or malnutrition, especially the' 
latter, are pathetic and miserable. 
Recent calculations show that the typical worker in southeast 
Brazil, because of improved health and increased life expectancy, will 
produce nearly 5 times as much during his lifetime as his average 
compatriot in nutritionally deficient northeast Brazil [11, p. 128]. 
The body, weak from lack of proper nutrients, protects itself by avoid-
ing the expenditure of energy. 
The countries with the lowest per capita daily protein consump-
tion invariably are those with lowest productivity. An interesting 
demonstration of this was noted during the construction of the Pan-
American Highway in Ecuador where the disappointing output of 
local laborers was quickly remedied with the provision of three well-
balanced daily meals. Within a few weeks, workers averaged an in-
crease in concrete paving from 1.8 to 5.9 cubic yards per day [11, p. 
128]. 
Unfortunately, about the only thing that lack of protein does 
not seem to affect deleteriously is the ability to procreate. It has 
been found that there is an almost perfect negative correlation between 
protein consumption and fertility rates among countries [12, p. 73]. 
Other Possible Resource Shortages 
If food is not becoming increasingly scarce it would seem to be 
relevant at this stage of the argument to inquire whether or not sup-
plies of other resources might eventually restrict the earth's ability 
to support life as we know it. It is my interpretation of the published 
reports I have seen that we have a rather long period of grace before 
we have much to worry about. 
An obvious concern must be energy production since such vast 
quantities are consumed in our mechanized world. Conservative esti-
mates of coal reserves show enough to meet world energy demands 
far into the future, well past 2100 A.D. If we add oil-shale and tar-
sand reserves to known liquid petroleum reserves, the world is amply 
stocked for several hundred years. Atomic energy would not be 
needed for well over 100 years. 
During 1966, 60 percent of all new power capacity contracted 
for in the United States was nuclear [92, p. 14]. Obviously, the 
development of atomic energy need not wait until the fossil fuels are 
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used up. The uranium potential of the United States alone for atomic 
energy production is a figure in energy equivalents much greater 
than the combined total of the world's known resources of recoverable 
coal and potential resources of oil and natural gas [81, p. 124] . 
Knowledgeable people at Oak Ridge are now talking seriously of 
atomic power costs of the order of 1.5 mills per kwh [92, p. 14]. In 
comparison, the average power cost in Logan is about 20 mills at the 
present time. This development is truly revolutionary in its implica-
tions. These power costs make previously impossible things possible, 
such as distillation of sea water for urban and agricultural use, 
sewage treatment by distillation, and perhaps the electric automobile 
[92, p. 14]. The energy picture would appear to be very bright in-
deed. 
The discovery and proving up of metallic mineral reserves is 
rarely projected more than 2 or 3 decades in advance. But enough 
is known in a rough sort of way to provide a fair degree of assurance 
of adequate supplies to year 2000 without any increase in relative 
cost of exploitation [37, p. 60]. 
Not so in the case of forestry products. The relative price of 
lumber has risen 300 percent since 1870. It is dubious that world 
forests ' can sustain the drain that is projected for the future [37, p. 50]. 
Fortunately, relatively good substitutes are abundantly available and 
inexpensive. The future of the world does not hang on the branch of 
a tree. 
Water shortages are essentially regional in scope and many ways 
exist to augment effective supplies [37, p. 63]. In most parts of the 
world it is primarily a question of maintaining quality and this can 
be done with available technology, if the will to invest is adequate. 
No serious national shortages are anticipated to the year 2000, and, 
with the advent of cheap power, all foreseeable needs can likely be 
met. 
Some scientists at Cal Tech have already pointed out [92, p. 20] 
that the ultimate constraint on human life may be the heat that is 
generated by our increasingly urbanized and mechanized society. In 
the Los Angeles area, for example, the amount of energy produced 
now is 2 to 3 percent of the solar energy received. If this were 
increased by a factor of 10, everyone in the area would literally be 
cooking. The absolute limit to human population would be reached 
when there are enough urbanized, technically advanced people that 
people-generated heat boils the water of the oceans. This constraint 
is hopefully some years in the future. 
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In light of the above it is rather clear that food production is our 
most critical short-term resource problem in the world. Ultimately, 
perhaps, man may have to find ways to circumvent shortages of some 
natural resources. But there is nothing alarming in this regard now 
on the horizon. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FOOD PRODUCTION AND 
GENERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A logical way to begin discussing increased food production is 
to point out that this is simply one component of general economic 
development. The problems and constraints resemble those in nearly 
all kinds of production. Any production (including agricultural) in-
volves utilization of resources and inputs of technology and manage-
ment, and must be accompanied by incentives to produce. 
Agriculture is also related to the general economy in another 
crucial way. If agricultural production is increased beyond the needs 
of producer families, markets must be available. Almost all countries 
with a growing industrial class also have a prospering agricultural 
sector. When both sectors develop together, there is much mutual 
reinforcement and the total economy grows faster than if only one 
sector were moving forward. 
Along this line Dr. A. T. Mosher said: 
"In the last analysis the world's food problem is not a food problem at all. 
It is a problem of expanding productivity, no matter what form that produc-
tivity may take coupled with achievement of an income distribution in each 
country that can convert the food needs of all people into an economic 
demand. In light of this, food supply per capita is only a barometer. The 
problem is opportunities for rising productivity per worker" [52, p.25]. 
In countries where farming has been at subsistence levels for 
centuries, the problems of getting farmers to become a commercial 
class, where inputs are market purchased and outputs are market 
sold, are indeed formidable and cannot be validly glossed over. Yet, 
we have not adequate space nor time to explore problems of economic 
development in detail here. Suffice it to say that -growth of the 
non-farm economy is essential to a profitable agriculture. Farmers 
are able to purchase fertilizer, tools, high yielding seeds, pesticides, 
and irrigation water only if the non-farm economy is vigorous and 
provides markets for agricultural output [43, p. 4] [101, p. 15]. Thus, 
it is significant in projecting potential agricultural prosperity that 
practically all nations in the world have been making progress in per 
capita productivity. 
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Farmers producing under subsistence conditions are extremely 
hesitant to assume new risks. They live so close to real hunger that 
if they make a mistake, it could cause them and their families extreme 
hardship and even death. If a farmer is to invest in modem inputs 
such as improved seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides, they must be easily 
acquired, and there must be no possibility of crop failure. Also, 
credit must be available as very few subsistence farmers have cash 
with which to finance input purchases. 
The matter of incentives is especially vital. A great economist, 
Professor T. W. Schultz, has argued that lack of incentives explains 
lagging food production in the less-developed nations. 
"A typical refrain runs thus: Farmers fann badly; they are not industrious; 
they loaf too much; they squander their savings; and they prefer not to 
improve their economic lot. So a doctrine is born which has misled us 
badly. We have been blind to the plain fact that farmers in poor countries 
are shrewd, hardheaded, calculating people in their economic affairs. When-
ever there is a real payoff, they respond" [79, p.21]. 
This fundamental and important fact has been dramatically evident 
to our own team of Utah State University scientists in Boliva, working 
with farmers as poor and ill-trained as almost any in the world. When 
cash was offered on the spot for their wool, the Bolivian campesino 
not only was, eager to shear his sheep and sell his wool, which he had 
never done before, but wanted to know how he could improve his 
flock. 
In reality, economic policies administered in poor countries have 
almost invariably been the opposite of those required to increase food 
output. Farm product prices have been held at artificially low levels 
in an attempt to foster industrial development and to check inflation. 
This shifts the terms of trade against agriculture and induces capital 
movement away from farming. The process provides low food prices 
to urban consumers, and thus aids the process of industrialization, 
but at the expense of the farmer. 
Moreover, the modern inputs which are needed to increase pro-
duction are very expensive and often alien to the farmer. In fact, 
the input prices are distorted also, but on the high side. Competition 
in the input markets is weak and is much impaired by artificial bar-
riers on imports in order to protect inefficient domestic producers,. 
Chile is a good example. She is one of the world's largest exporters 
of nitrogenous fertilizer and yet they are very expensive to her own 
farmers. The Chilians reason as follows: The fertilizer which is 
exported must be sold at the world price. Since it is low, it is pre-
sumed it must be sold at a loss. To offset this loss Chilean farmers 
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must be charged a price that is far above world market levels. Thus, 
Chilean farmers, and eventually Chilean food consumers, bear the 
burden of this perverted policy [79, p. 20]. 
I believe the importance of incentives is inescapable, even at 
present levels of technology in poor countries. The response of 
farmers to favorable farm prices and low input prices would astound 
us all. During World War II we saw what farmers can do if food 
prices rise rapidly. Our American farmers responded by increasing 
output by fully one-third in 5 years, and with much less labor. The 
large quantities of under-utilized labor in the less-developed countries 
could and would be used if incentives were present. 
Of course, technology will not remain at present levels. Most of 
us are well-acquainted with the fantastic and largely unforeseen tech-
nological advances that took place in American agriculture over the 
past quarter century. I know of no reasons why the rate of advance 
should slow down in the foreseeable future. Much of this technology 
might be ultimately transferable to less-developed countries, but 20 
years of technical assistance has shown us that there are many prob-
lems in trying to adapt our technology in the poor countries. Much 
more research is needed to make sure that a given technology is applic-
able and economically feasible. Then management training and ex-
tension programs will be required to implement that which is feasible. 
Training for competent technicians who can mount programs of 
technological advance in the rural areas is an acute need in the poor 
countries. In all of Africa 10 years ago, only 10 college graduates in 
agriculture were produced each year, and even now the number is 
only ISO. Ten years ago all of Latin America produced only 750 
trained agriculturists per year, and only 1,100 now. By contrast, 
Japan alone produces 7,000 per year. In Japan there is one farm 
advisor for every 600 farms. In Colombia the ratio is one for 10,000 
farms, and in Indonesia, one for perhaps 100,000 farms [92, p. 34]. 
In satisfying this training need, the developed countries could have 
help immeasurably, but our best efforts have not been spent in this 
direction. 
No discussion of institutions and incentives is complete without 
considering land reform. As generally defined, land reform consist~ 
of changing the cultivator's relation to the land in a land-tenure 
system. In most less-developed countries, a reasonable reward is 
denied the cultivator who works under extremely adverse conditions. 
Existing tenure systems promote the concentration of land ownership 
among a few people, low yields but high rents, poor farmers but 
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expensive farms, too many people living on too little land. In Asia, 
rents of up to 70 percent are common even when the landlord pro-
vides only the land [59, p. 91]. Meaningful land reform encompasses 
all or most of the following elements: more equitable distribution of 
land among the citizens, security of tenure and fair rents, better 
methods of cultivation through technological improvement, and ade-
quate credit and marketing services. 
This matter of land reform is closely akin to the basic question 
of political power. Lack of land tenure and production incentives 
often result from the fact that the rural masses have little political 
power and are victimized by the ruling oligarchy. There needs to 
be a major overhauling of political institutions in many of the poor 
nations. 
The temptation is to look at the admittedly sorry state of the 
world's political, social, and economic institutions and conclude that 
little progress is likely in food production. I contend, however, that 
exactly the opposite conclusion is more warranted. If technology, 
institutions, incentives, etc., were all optimal and we had trouble 
feeding the earth's people, then indeed the situation would appear 
to be hopeless. But so many improvements can be made on so many 
fronts, virtually all of which can be readily manipulated by man if he 
has the will, that we should not be discouraged. 'Ve must rather 
press on with the task of making progress where we can. Let us see 
what some of the more promising possibilities are. 
Increasing Land Acreage and Irrigation Water 
Authorities differ in estimates of idle agricultural land that might 
be brought into production. One study published in 1964 reports 
that only 25 percent of the world's potentially productive arable lands 
are unused [37, p. 54]. 
Another estimate states that crop production could be expanded 
to three times the present acreage [86, p. 102]. Still another indicates 
that the world has approximately 6.6 billion acres of potentially till-
able land and about 3.3 billion are presently under the plow [39, p. 
316]. It is agreed, however, that nearly 90 percent of the additional 
lands involve tropical soils, which have some limitations when used 
for food production. 
I have no way of judging which of the acreage estimates is most 
reliable. If any are near the mark, it is evident that considerable 
expansion in cropland is possible if the need becomes critical. 
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In the United States we have withdrawn from production about 
56 million acres of our best cropland under various governmental 
programs. A recent Conservation Needs Survey classifies 638 million 
acres as class I. II, or III, classes that indicate suitability for cropping. 
In reality we are now harvesting crops from, slightly more than 300 
million acres, a little of which is class IV land. We also have vast 
areas that could be drained or irrigated and made into productive 
land [8, p. 218]. 
Immense potentialities exist in the world for providing irrigation 
water to thirsty cropland. The most promising possibilities are in the 
Indus River Valley, the Tigris-Euphrates River Valley, the Nile Val-
ley, and several places in the Soviet Union. India and Pakistan, it is 
argued, could multiply their production of food many times by intel-
ligent development of the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra river sys-
tems [76, p. 104]. Some of the largest acquifers in the world underlie 
areas of India and Pakistan which have perennial drought problems 
[87, p. 15]. In North Africa, exciting new possibilities have been 
opened up by recent evidence indicating that large areas in the 
Sahara are underlined by an enormous lake of fresh water, perhaps 
as much as 100 billion acre-feet, enough to irrigate many billions of 
acres for centuries. 
There are also limitless possibilities for improving irrigation effi-
ciency on lands that are now irrigated. Such improvements will permit 
more productive and more valuable crops to be grown and might 
allow double cropping in a single year in some tropical areas. 
Of course, bringing new lands into production and building irri-
gation works require large sums of capital. At this time capital is very 
scarce in the poor countries. The point is, however, that the world 
has much unused land and undeveloped water that might be used 
whenever those in power decide that they are needed to increase food 
production. 
The Impact of Fertilization 
The factor having the greatest impact on increasing food pro-
duction in the developed countries over the past 25 years has been 
the use of chemical fertilizers. The incentive to use them has been 
obvious as the price of fertilizer has declined by about one-half 
relative to the price of major farm products [8, p. 229]. Unfortu-
nately, this decline in the price has not been extended to the less .. 
) developed countries. Often fertilizers are not available there at 
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any price. But if they are available, farmers find them too expensive. 
Let me give a few comparisons in fertilizer use. 
Developed countries use 5 times as much fertilizer per acre as do 
less-developed ones. Europe uses about 20 times as much as do 
Africa and Asia, and 9 times as much as does Latin America. Japan 
uses over 100 times as much as do India and Pakistan [84, p. 19]. 
Despite the fact that the less-developed countries have been slow 
to apply fertilizer, real progress has been made in the last few years. 
The accepted yardstick of 10 tons of grain produced for each ton of 
nitrogen applied indicates that the food grain production base in 
1967 is perhaps 7 or 8 million tons greater than in 1964 [54, p. 110]. 
The severe droughts in Asia in 1965 and 1966 obscured the real gains 
that would have occurred if the weather had permitted the effect 
of increased fertilizer use to be realized. With favorable weather, the 
food grain yields would have risen about 3 percent per year in 1965 
and 1966. Government projections for the next 3 years suggest that 
enough fertilizer will be used in the less-developed countries to sus-
tain a rate of growth in grain yields of about 3 percent a year. A 
10: 1 ratio of yields to fertilizers is conservative. It is based on old 
seed varieties, and even for them the tested response for relatively 
small applications is greater than 10 to 1. New seeds with sub-
stantially larger potential responses bring another dimension to the 
prospects for a faster rate of agricultural production through fertilizer 
use [54, p. 1110]. 
Completed research clearly demonstrates the economics of fer-
tilizer use. The F AO Freedom from Hunger Campaign has recently 
completed a series of 95,000 fertilizer demonstrations and field trials 
in 14 less-developed countries. These trials involved many crops; 
wheat, barley, rice, corn, beans, cotton, potatoes, yams, sugarbeets, 
peanuts, and other vegetables. Substantial increases in yields were 
obtained with moderate dosages of fertilizer, even when no other tech-
nical factors were changed. For example, the increases in yields in 
grains and beans were about the lowest of crops tested and yet ran 
from 30 to 120 percent, with benefit-cost ratios running from 2.3:1 to 
7.0:1 [33, p. 112]. 
To see how easily fertilizer use could alter the food production 
picture in the world, consider the following relationships. One ton 
of plant nutrients will produce about 10 tons of cereals, 36 million 
calories, which would be enough to provide 2,400 calories to 40 people 
for 1 year. One fertilizer plant producing 1,000 tons of nutrients per 
day would, therefore, ultimately provide 2,400 calories per day for 
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about 15 million people for 1 year. The fertilizer factory would 
cost in the neighborhood of 60 million dollars, or approximately $4 
for each person provided with food. With these kinds of payoffs, it 
is expected that fertilizer use will grow very rapidly in the less-
developed world and will make a substantial contribution to increased 
food production despite the unwise price and institutional policies in 
many countries [69, p. 80]. 
Developments in Plant Breeding 
Because insufficient protein is the greatest contributing factor 
to malnutrition in the less-developed countries, some recent results 
in breeding high-protein grains qualify as a momentous advance in 
the field of nutrition. Scientists at Purdue University have discovered 
that the protein quality of some com varieties can be increased to 
about 90 percent of that contained in milk. Surveys from Latin 
America show that the proportion of the total calorie intake from 
com runs as high as 72 percent in some villages of Guatemala [82]. 
Thus, a substantial increase in the protein quality content of corn 
could considerably upgrade the nutrition of people in com-consuming 
countries. 
The increase in protein quality in corn equates with an increase 
in its lysine (an essential amino acid) content. Working with adult 
human beings, Purdue researchers have shown that high-lysine corn 
is twice as good for supplying protein for man as in normal com. 
Children could grow normally with high-lysine com as the sole source 
of carbohydrates and protein if they received supplements of vitamins 
and minerals [75 pp. 27-28]. Since approximately one-half of the 
world's com supply is eaten by human beings, this development will 
have a direct and uplifting effect on world nutrition [45, p. 2]. 
High-lysine com in animal rations will be especially valuable in 
swine rations because of the amino acid relationships in swine nutri-
tion. Young pigs that were fed this com for 21 days gained weight 
over 3 times faster than did pigs fed normal corn [45, p. 2]. Research 
in Illinois indicates that high-lysine corn, even in a dry year produces 
yields 85 percent of that of regular corn. Some lines produced more 
than 90 percent. In addition, most of these hybrids were free of 
ergot, and standability compared favorably with regular com. A 
hybrid containing this trait could conceivably be ready for commercial 
f production by 1971 [45, p. 3]. 
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Other grains may incorporate similar potentials, and an intensive 
effort is being made to identify traits in sorghum, wheat, rice, and 
other members of the grass family. It is only a question of time until 
our plant scientists improve the protein quantity and quality of all 
our cereals. Already researchers at the University of Idaho have 
succeeded in isolating strains of a wild-oat species, closely related 
to cultivated oats, that run as high as 30 percent protein, which is 
almost double the normal amount [70, p. 11]. With more than half 
of the 80 odd million tons of protein consumed in the world every 
year being eaten in the form of grain, the significance of these devel-
opments is obvious [11, p. 130]. 
Other spectacular developments in plant breeding are equally 
relevant to my contention that the world starvation is far from inevi-
table. The work in Mexico, undertaken jointly by the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the :t\1exican government, is a notable case in point. 
New dwarf varieties of wheat are being grown in Mexico that produce 
3 times more per acre than Mexican farmers realized in 1943 with 
other varieties, and are now among the highest yielding in the world. 
Under research conditions these seeds outproduce the old varieties 
by 40 to 100 percent or more at the same level of fertilizer application 
and are more responsive to higher rates of fertilization [54, p. 1110]. 
This single development has been instrumental in Mexico's success-
fully and sharply increasing her per capita food production despite 
heavy population growth. The international dimension of the dwarf 
wheats are being seen in 1967 and 1968, as the Mexican dwads are 
being introduced on an estimated 12 to 15 billion acres. in 15 different 
countries [75, p. 55]. These countries will thus be able to increase 
their wheat yields in 5 years to a level that required 15 years to 
accomplish in Mexico. 
One of the 15 countries, Pakistan, has already imported 42,000 tons 
of wheat seed of the dwad varieties from Mexico. This transaction 
was the largest single purchase of wheat seed negotiated anywhere 
in the world [75, pp. 64-65]. One scientist working with the Inter-
national Wheat Program opines that yields of wheat will be doubled 
within a decade ali around the world [85, p. 284]. 
Perhaps even more impressive, is what is happening with rice in 
the Far East. Rice is. the staple food of approximately half of the 
human race [95, p. 137]. For hundreds of millions of people in Asia, 
it constitutes virtually the whole diet. It occupies between one-half 
and two-thirds of the total arable land in major rice producing 
countries and a much larger proportion of the most fertile soils. 
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The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations working in the Philip-
pines at Los Banos have made fantastic progress in developing more 
productive rice [8, p. 17]. In practically every yield test from the 
Philippines to Pakistan, the new rice variety was either at the top or 
near the top with yields usually ranging from 2.5-4.0 tons per acre 
[85, p. 299]. In countries where yields commonly average from .4 to 
.8 tons per acre, these increases open up possibilities previously un-
dreamed of. 
A good example is a recent report from Viet Nam: 
'~The recent experiences in Vo Dat district indicate that IR-8 seeds produce 
over 16,000 pounds of rice per hectare as compared with 4,800 pounds per 
hectare from the variety previously planted. And because IR-8 can be hal'-
vested from three to seven weeks earlier than most of the 454 Vietnamese 
varieties, farmers can easily get two crops a year, whereas 95 percent of 
Vietnamese farmers now only get one crop" [77, p. A17]. 
These kinds of field results led a USDA economist, who has spent 
the last year studying the food situation in India and the Far East, to 
report that the evidence suggests that the rate of food production in 
that part of the world will increase about 3.0 percent each year in 
the immediate years ahead [54, p. 1112]. His prognostication is based 
on programs and technology already in hand. The rate he estimates 
is substantially ahead of the rate of population growth, and in a 
very few years could well be double the population growth in this 
area where it is commonly alleged that famine problems are most 
pressing. 
Shifts from Animals to Plants 
In the more developed countries man has acquired a palate which 
is attuned to animal products as the basis of his diet. Although there 
is no biological requirement for animal protein in the human diet [92, 
p. 51], we omnivores do like the taste of meat. The extravagence in 
the use of resources that is necessary to produce edible meat may be 
tolerated in well-fed countries, but not in those that are short of food. 
The husbandry of animals for meat may not even be tolerated in rich 
countries when animal products can be perfectly simulated by plant 
products at lower cost. 
Judicious mixing of different kinds of cereals and oil seeds can 
produce a perfectly adequate source of protein for the human diet. 
The versatility of foods incorporating just oil-seed protein is almost 
unlimited. They can be made to taste like almost any kind of meat, 
; and of course are free of cholesterol. Tenderness or toughness can 
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be varied at will, and the level of nutrition can be adjusted as desired. 
These pre-cooked products require no refrigeration, and have good 
keeping properties if they are protected from moisture [8, p. 142]. 
The potential effect upon the world hunger spectre that might 
result from substitution of plant for animal foods is suggested in the 
following quotation: 
"The residue that is left when oil is compressed from soya, ground nut, 
cotton seed, and sunflower material is now, for the most part, used as animal 
feed for fertilizer, or is simply discarded. It contains about 20 million tons 
of protein, which is twice the world's present estimated deficit. If we could 
all tum vegetarian in this country (the USA) we would be able to export 
an amount of food each day which would be 1.5 times as great as the daily 
production of foods by India" [92, p. 37]. 
The American yearly output of potential food calories is about 
11,000 calories per person per day, almost 9,000 of which are wasted, 
in a sense, by being put through animals. 
The most extreme example of the inefficiency of foods from 
animals in relation to food from plants is the case of fish taken from 
the sea. 
"Fish do not eat plants, they eat animals, or even worse, they eat animals 
that eat animals that eat animals. At each step in the food chain, 90 percent 
of the input calories are lost in supporting the activities of that linle It takes 
100 pounds of original plant to make 1 pound of codfish" [92, p. 37] . 
Of course, the example is not highly relevant at present since 
man hasn't found a way as yet to use the plant life of the ocean 
directly for food. 
The conversion of plants into synthetic foods resembling those 
from animals requires a high input of technology and capital. Al-
though synthetic foods are now produced at competitive costs in the 
rich countries, they are a long way from being competitive in the 
poor countries. The important factor will ultimately be the relative 
costs of the various. inputs. When capital is cheap and land expensive, 
man will necessarily seek to maximize the product per unit of land. 
The least costly alternative could then well be the synthetic foods 
which are efficient in the use of land. If land is plentiful and capital 
is expensive, however, man may continue to indulge his liking for 
animal products. On a long-run basis, however, the economic rela-
tionships and the directions of technological change seems to clearly 
favor plant simulation of animal products. 
Another dramatic breakthrough which is just beginning to be 
reported is the production of edible protein by growing single cell 
organisms on natural gas, petroleum, vegetable wastes, or even coal. 
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The Dutch Shell Company, for example, has found a bacterium, con-
taining about 50 percent protein, which uses methane, a natural gas, 
as its sole source of energy for reproduction. The expectation is that 
wholesome and nutritious products, utilizing energy from petroleum 
or natural gas, can be developed and produced in almost unlimited 
quantities within a decade [11, p. 133]. The oil pumped out of the 
earth's crust each day contains approximately the same number of 
calories as are contained in the food used by the entire human race. 
It is simply a question of learning to convert petroleum to something 
digestible [92, p. 37]. Now we know what to do with the petroleum 
reserves that might be rendered valueless for energy production by 
nuclear power. 
The potential advantages of producing food by this method are 
many: the abundance of petroleum even in many food-short countries, 
the independence from climatic uncertainties, the small space require-
ment, and the need for only a few agricultural technicians. Most of 
the world's major petroleum producing countries are deeply com-
mitted to food research projects, and it is only a matter of time until 
the technology and economics are worked out to permit commercial 
production to take place. 
Scientific imagination has gone even further. Milk has been 
produced from water-soaked leaves, seaweed, and algae. A French 
company recently discovered an entire West African village success-
fully using algae as its basic protein source [11, p. 133]. 
These few examples must suffice to demonstrate that the possi-
bilities for producing calories and protein are almost unlimited. 
Food from the Sea 
Food from the sea has often been proposed as the solution to 
man's food problems if all else fails. The oceans and the seas cover 
more than 70 percent of the surface of the earth and contain untold 
quantities of protein material, yet this abundance has scarcely been 
touched by man. Most of the known fish populations of commercial 
value in the Northern Hemisphere have been fished intensively. Even 
in these areas however, the catch is generally a small proportion of 
the total biological material that the sea produces. 'Vith a few 
exceptions, the tropical and Southern Hemisphere waters are relatively 
unexploited [8, p. 147]. 
The contribution which a wisely managed world fishery could 
make to better diets has never been adequately explored, but it is 
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undoubtedly large. Presently fish supplies contribute only about 10 
percent of the total world animal protein consumption and amount 
to 1 percent of the total food [37, p. 57]. Potentially, the greatest 
contribution may come from relatively unfamiliar but abundant fishes 
that can be turned into an edible product containing 80 percent pro-
tein. The United States Congress has recently authorized a pilot 
plant that will produce a fish-protein concentrate for an estimated 
13.9 cents per pound. This is considerably less than the cost of obtain-
ing protein from dry milk solids. Aside from the cost, fishermen 
would be able to sell under-utilized species of fish, and fishing effi-
ciency could be much improved [8, p. 157]. This, to be sure, does 
offer exciting opportunities if the nations seeking to exploit the 
resource will establish regulations and proceed on an orderly and 
rational basis. 
Aid from Developed to Less-Developed Countries 
We now come to those issues that should directly concern all of 
us, the assistance that developed countries can and should give to 
less-developed ones. 
The economies of rich and poor countries have grown at about 
the same rate during the last decade-about 4 percent per year. But 
because of differences in population growth, the per capita growth 
is nearly 3 percentage points more for rich countries as in poor ones 
and the gap is widening every year. The crisis of our day is not the 
food problem per se, but the widening gap in per capita incomes. Mrs. 
Dorothy J aco bson, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, has compiled 
some illustrative statistics recently. 
"There are only some 33 countries in the world where per capita incomes 
exceed $500 per person per year. About 30 have per capita incomes ranging 
between $200 to $500 per year. Fifty nations have per capita incomes of 
less than $200, and 12 of these have average per capita incomes of less than 
$100 per year. In these 12 countries live about half of the population of 
the world" [87, p. 8]. 
If we are to live in a peaceful, stable world, substantial economic and 
technical aid must flow from rich to poor countries. 
Developed countries can and do provide support in many ways 
to the less-developed countries in the food production area. These 
can be roughly classified into direct food aid, direct aid in capital 
resources, and aid in technical research, education, and extension 
programs . 
. Aid is proferred by an extremely diverse group of institutions, 
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international agencies, national governments, private foundations, 
universities, business firms, churches, and labor unions to name only 
a few of the most important. Each group has its own interests to 
satisfy and contribution to make, and obviously the job is big enough 
to utilize all who have the resources and the will to assist. Let us 
look first at the effort being expended in direct food shipments. 
The United States has been the principal donor country in direct 
food aid. We shipped $19 billion worth of food overseas between 
the enactment of Public Law 480 in 1954 and the end of 1966. Our 
primary motivation has been to reduce the stocks of surpluses that 
resulted from our unwise domestic agricultural programs. About 
one-half of our food shipments were paid for in the "soft" currencies 
of the recipient countries [8, p. 189]. Shipments have been sent pri-
marily to the Middle East, Mrica, Latin America, and the Far East. 
India has received more food aid than any other country, with tre-
mendous quantities of wheat being sent to carry her over the droughts 
in 1965 and 1966. 
As recently as 1966, President Johnson announced the Food for 
Freedom Program. The Food for Freedom bill changes the emphasis 
from Public Law 480 days of direct food shipments. The new doctrine 
emphasized self-help to accelerate food production within the poor 
nations themselves. In four places, the bill refers to assistance to 
those countries that are determined to meet their population prob-
lems. I believe these developments are on the right track and should 
produce progress on both population and food fronts. 
Most economists are critical of our direct food aid programs as a 
helpful factor in economic development. Food aid serves to depress 
producer prices and discourages the development of local agriculture 
[8, p. 191] [80, p. 230]. N ow that our surpluses are almost gone we 
are relying almost entirely on sales of food in exchange for dollars 
at world market prices. Thus present food shipments can hardly be 
called aid. 
The food producing capacities of developed countries are vastly 
greater, even under present technology, than current production 
would indicate. For many years our farm policies have had to deal 
with surpluses, and various supply-control measures have been used 
to reduce production. If, however, food prices were rising because 
of food shortages and expanding markets, or if production incentives 
were given to farmers, there is little doubt that output would be 
significantly increased. This increased output would be available to 
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the less-developed nations in the fonn of sales or aid, whichever seems 
most desirable under the circumstances. 
On the question of aid in the fonn of capital resources, data 
assembled for 36 developing countries for the years 1962 to 1964 on 
net investment in relation to gross domestic production indicate a 
median ratio of 11 percent. Eight percent was provided from domes-
tic and 3 percent from foreign sources [5, pp. 1-19]. In 1965 it 
was estimated that the total flow of financial resources to less-
developed countries bi-laterally and through international agencies 
totaled almost exactly a mere 1 percent of the total national income 
of the developed countries. This amounts to approximately $6 billion 
per year [92, p. 15]. Of this total, public resources amounted to just 
under two-thirds and private sources just over one-third [5, pp. 1-19]. 
The United States stood very near the average for the group of donor 
countries. 
The United States extended loans and grants for non-military aid 
to the extent of 1.3 percent of our gross national product in 1950. By 
1960 this had dropped to .4 percent and by 1965 to only .3 percent, 
and over 50 percent of this was in the fonn of loans [14, p. 17]. 
George D. Woods, President of the World Bank, estimates that 
$3 to $4 billion more could be effectively used for development by 
the world's poor countries at the present time [92, p. 15]. As time 
goes by, considerably more than this could be absorbed. 
My own view is that the rich countries can well afford to expend 
a substantially greater total effort in offering aid of all kinds than 
is now being made. Also, a much greater proportion should be given 
as technical, educational, and economic aid, with a much smaller 
proportion than now as military aid. We must think primarily of 
long-run development. Top priority should be given to increasing 
the productivity of agriculture. We must increase the investment 
in education and basic research. The less-developed nations have 
very few first-rate research stations, and those that exist are generally 
managed by foreign foundations and employ foreign technicians. 
This situation persists despite 2 decades of technical aid. 
If anything, the disparity in numbers of trained personnel between 
the developed and under-developed world has widened. From 1956 
to 1960, for example, we imported 1,765 medical doctors from Latin 
,A.merica as a means of partially satisfying our tremendous need for 
trained physicians. From 1961 to 1965 we imported 2,500 more. We 
exported very few. In the 1965-66 Foreign Exchange Program, 
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125,000 students were participating from countries outside the U. S., 
already 11,000 of them have chosen to remain here. "We have the 
ironic and tragic phenomenon of a flow of high quality brain power 
out of the less-developed countries where they are most needed into 
the developed countries, especially the United States, the most devel-
oped of all" [92, p. 64]. 
Yet another important point must be made in this discussion of 
relationships between rich and poor nations. It is vital for the devel-
oped world to move increasingly toward free trade in its commercial 
dealings with the under-developed world. Less-developed nations 
would likely follow, since it would be to their advantage to do so. 
Countries could specialize in producing commodities that provide the 
greatest comparative advantage. Perhaps even more important, free 
trade allows the smallest of countries to capture the rewards of econ-
omies of large scale production. Thus little Switzerland, which has 
hardly any natural resources prospers as the watchmaker of the world. 
The protectionist policies of the less-developed countries, known 
as imported substitution, have been very costly. These countries have 
protected their domestic producers of commodities that could be 
acquired more cheaply from abroad. They have done this because 
they have been short on foreign exchange. The only way the less-
developed countries can get foreign exchange to make purchases in 
the international market is for the developed countries to open up 
their own domestic markets to goods from the poorer countries. And 
this applies to inputs of agricultural production as well as outputs. 
The Common Market and other free-trade arrangements have clearly 
shown what elimination of trade barriers can do. Much less direct 
aid would be needed if trade could be improved, and political relations 
between trading partners tend to be better than relations between 
donor and recipient of charity. 
To summarize briefly, the prospects for producing more food are 
indeed so promising and so diverse that wide-spread recognition of 
them may lead to complacency. Agriculture is a complex productive 
system, and increasing agricultural production is actually a problem 
in systems analysis. Advocates of each of the separate areas where 
sizeable gains can be made, will be tempted to believe that his diag-
nosis of the problem and his prescription for overcoming it should 
have top priority. This is mistaken strategy. A wide range of inter-
acting institutional, social, and economic conditions must be simul-
tapeously satisfied if production increases are to be optimized. Pro-
gress must be made simultaneously on all relevant fronts. Fertilizer 
-41-
cannot solve all our problems, neither can land reform, nor birth con-
trol, nor substitution of plant protein for animal protein in our diets. 
All can help and progress in one area is likely to reinforce progress in 
other areas. If we have the technology and resources to make the 
kind of progress we need, then we must alter the impeding institutions 
so that it can occur. This is where our real challenge lies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Perhaps I have surprised you with my basically optimistic view 
that man will find ways to stabilize population and eliminate hunger. 
Lest any of you reject my argument out of hand on the basis of youth-
ful naivete, let me hasten to add that I believe man has problems 
aplenty to fully challenge his tremendous capacities. Indeed, the 
population-food problems which I have discussed will offer challenge 
enough, but I am confident that man will be able to successfully con-
quer these problems. 
I am much less confident that man can save himself and his civili-
zation from nuclear destruction, but I profess no particular expertise 
in this area, and perchance this accounts for my pessimism. I have 
read that laboratory experiments with animals have conclusively 
proved that over-crowding produces uncontrollable aggressiveness 
[60, p. 177]. If I am wrong about population stabilization, it is pos-
sible, even likely, in my opinion, that social stresses and tensions will 
shatter our social and political institutions, and violence will bring 
us down long before we starve to death. This eventuality is no less 
terrifying than famine, maybe even more so. 
H we learn to control our numbers and provide for our nutritional 
needs, we will have made only a beginning, albeit, a very important 
beginning toward solving more vexing problems. Man simply must 
learn to cope with problems of crowding in significant ways. Even if 
population should become static at present levels, we will be happier if 
we scatter ourselves out so that it appears that we are less crowded 
than we really are. Most of our cities are already far too large [92 pp. 
151-156] to be either manageable or pleasantly habitable. Readyac-
cess to outdoor recreation could allow people to experience the exhil-
arating freedom of space and room. Many would welcome wilderness-
type experiences as a way to maintain our links with the rest of nature. 
Our working and living quarters should be spacious and saturated with 
plant and animal life to give us the feeling of being close to nature. 
The deplorable quality of our air and water resources attests to over-
-42-
crowding and unwise technology. In a physically satisfying environ-
ment man might fulfill his promise. He could perhaps create the 
institutions - local, national and international - that would assure a 
high level of resource productivity, material prosperity and comfort 
for all who crave them, along with a tranquil international environ-
ment, where man can pursue the bounties of the mind and the spirit 
while living in serenity amidst beauty. 
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THIRTY-SEVENTH FACULTY HONOR LECTURE 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY 
April 17, 1968 
A basic objective of The Faculty Association of the Utah State 
University, in the words of its constitution, is: 
to encourage intellectual growth and development of its 
members by sponsoring and arranging for the publication of 
two annual faculty research lectures in the fields, or (1) the 
biological and exact sciences, including engineering, called 
the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the National Sciences; 
and (2) the humanities and social sciences, including educa-
tion and business administration, called the Annual Faculty 
Honor Lecture in the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these 
aims and shares the costs of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty Asso-
ciation. Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing 
lecturers are, in the words of the constitution: 
(1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) 
publication of research through recognized channels in the 
field of the proposed lecture; (3) outstanding teaching over an 
extended period of years; (4) personal influence in developing 
the character of the students. 
Dr. Gardner was selected by the committee to deliver the Annual 
Faculty Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members 
of the Association we are happy to present Dr. Gardner's paper: 
PROTEIN AND THE PILL - A PIVOTAL PARTNERSHIP 
Committee on Faculty Honor Lecture 
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